ABSTRACT This paper questions the prevailing notions that firms within industrial clusters have privileged access to ''tacit knowledge'' that is unavailable-or available only at high cost-to firms located elsewhere, and that such access provides competitive advantages that cause the growth and development of both firms and regions. It outlines a model of cluster dynamics emphasizing two mutually interdependent processes: the concentration of specialized and complementary epistemic communities, on the one hand, and entrepreneurship and a high rate of new firm formation on the other.
Introduction
In recent literature on the economic geography of clusters, it has become conventional to emphasize the seeming contradiction between ''globalization'', on the one hand, and the continued importance of geographic location and regional advantage, on the other (see, e.g. Markusen, 1996; Porter, 1998; Maskell, 2001; Narula, 2003) . Clusters, so the argument goes, are worthy of renewed attention not only because of their economic and social significance, but also because globalization has made the problems they pose to economic theory more puzzling. Why is it, precisely, that-in spite of dramatic reductions in communication and transportation costs-firms in some locations appear to be systematically more innovative, more productive and more dynamic than in others?
In addressing this question, this paper questions the prevailing notions that firms within industrial clusters have privileged access to ''tacit knowledge'' that is unavailable-or available only at high cost-to firms located elsewhere, and that such access provides competitive advantages that explain the growth and development of both firms and regions. The argument is based on a complementary and, I shall argue, for some purposes more useful way of defining clusters than that commonly employed. Rather than seeing clusters primarily as concentrations of interlinked industries, producing similar or complementary outputs, it is instructive to recognize that they are also agglomerations of professionals, that is, practitioners belonging to the same or related epistemic communities (Loasby, 1998) . 1 Shifting the unit of observation from the firm to individuals as economic agents provides a different perspective on innovation and entrepreneurship and puts in a different light the nature of the advantages that clusters may provide (Audretsch, 1995 (Audretsch, , 2002 . As summarized in a simple model of cluster dynamics, I shall argue that we need to recognize-more clearly than is usually done-that the logic of the system, that is, the cluster, is different from that driving the behavior and performance of its components, that is, the individuals and firms of which it is formed. Indeed, the latter cannot be deduced from the former. Doing so obscures the nature of the causal links between co-located economic activities as empirically observed (cf. Markusen, 1999) .
Contrary to what is commonly assumed, it is not at all clear that clusters provide to existing firms more favorable overall conditions than are available elsewhere. Indeed, as detailed below, the empirical evidence available as to the effect of location on firm performance lends surprisingly weak support to the prevailing notion that the clustering of firms active in the same or related industries creates ''localization economies'' and is beneficial for firm survival and growth. If true, this conclusion is seemingly paradoxical: Why are firms in many industries clustered in certain locations and regions if this brings them no benefits? And why do such regions often grow faster than others if they do not offer better conditions than those available elsewhere?
In pursuing these questions, I shall hypothesize that the key factor for cluster growth and prosperity is a high rate of new firm formation, induced by, for example, positive attitudes to entrepreneurship, growing demand and favorable technological regimes. The activities undertaken by new firms typically reflect the experience and knowledge acquired by their founders while employed in other firms, active in the same or related industries. New business ideas are often based on perceived opportunities of better meeting the service or product needs of the customers of former employers, of the employing firms themselves and their competitors, or of applying knowledge gained in their service to new customer groups. Over time, the cumulative result of such entrepreneurial activities is the formation not only of clusters of firms active in the same and related industries but also of local concentrations of professionals whose shared expertise is exploited in the practice of local firms. These processes, it may be noted, are largely independent of-and do not necessarily imply-very close relationships between co-located firms. However, for founders of new firms and their employees, a cluster location confers a primary benefit by offering alternative employment when new ventures fail, as indeed most do. By reducing the negative consequences of business failures, local entrepreneurship is, in turn, encouraged.
The proposed shift in perspective has obvious but important policy implications. On the one hand, it adds further weight to existing arguments for policies aimed at creating institutional environments conducive to entrepreneurship and new firm formation; on the other, it questions the efficacy of policies designed to strengthen existing (or nascent) industrial clusters by differentially supporting firms in certain industries and locations rather than others (Boekholt and Thuriaux, 1999) .
The Prevailing View and its Antecedents
Until the early 1970s, the existence of ''industrial complexes'' (as they were then known) was largely explained in terms of Weberian least cost calculations, where alternative locations were evaluated primarily on the basis of the cost and availability of capital, labor and physical productive resources (Isard and Schooler, 1959; Smith, 1971) . However, with the dramatic reduction of transportation and communication costs, the inadequacy of this approach became increasingly obvious. By the middle of the decade, economic geographers and regional scientists-under the guise of ''industrial systems analysis'' or ''geography of the firm''-began to search for alternative models and approaches. (See, e.g. Linge (1979, 1981) for interesting but seemingly forgotten contributions.) Shortly thereafter, the location of economic activity again (the pioneers in the study of localization of industry were all economists) attracted the interest also of scholars from other disciplines (Martin, 1999) .
Increasingly, the literature on regional economics began to emphasize the way that, in some regions, flexible manufacturing systems and forms of network governance would permit firms to capture and exploit knowledge externalities (or, less elegantly, ''spillovers''). Elaborate and flexible divisions of labor, it is now commonly argued, enable firms to better cope with the uncertainty of rapidly changing technologies. This gives rise to dynamic economies of learning, enabling firms in certain regions to maintain and exploit technological advantages that are insensitive to shifts or differences in factor costs (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Storper and Harrison, 1991; Storper, 1992; Asheim, 1996; Pouder and St. John, 1996; Malmberg and Maskell, 1997; Morgan, 1997; Porter, 1998; Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999; Keeble et al., 1999; Lawson, 1999; Lawson and Lorenz, 1999; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999a, b) .
It has been pointed out that this model of Marshallian industrial districts does not well describe all types of dynamic regional economies (Markusen, 1996) . Nevertheless, there seems to be general agreement of its basic features and its perceived applicability to a wide range of regions in both Europe and North America-especially those dominated by industries where skill and variety (rather than, for example, scale) are key to competition (Storper, 1992) .
It is not simply the concentration of skilled labor, suppliers and information that distinguish the region. A variety of regional institutions-including Stanford University, several trade associations and local business organizations, and a myriad of specialized consulting, market research, public relations and venture capital firms-provide technical, financial, and networking services which the region's enterprises often cannot afford individually. These networks defy sectoral barriers: individuals move easily from semiconductor to disk drive firms or from computer to network makers. They move from established firms to start-ups (or vice versa) and even to market research or consulting firms, and from consulting firms back into start-ups. And they continue to meet at trade shows, industry conferences, and the scores of seminars, talks, and social activities organized by local business organizations and trade associations. In these forums, relationships are easily formed and maintained, technical and market information is exchanged, business contacts are established, and new enterprises are 2 The supporting institutional, social and cultural elements of, say, Italian industrial districts are notably different from those of Silicon Valley or southern California but the pattern of personnel exchange, cooperation, risk and knowledge sharing appears to be sufficiently similar to view them as members of the same theoretical category (Goodman and Bamford, 1989; Pyke and Sengenberger, 1990) . Hence-although developed in different contexts and for different specific objectives-the concepts of ''industrial complexes'', ''clusters'' and ''industrial districts'' are for the present purposes sufficiently similar to be treated interchangeably.
conceived … This decentralized and fluid environment also promotes the diffusion of technological capabilities and understandings. (Saxenian, 1994: 96-97) The quotation asserts a key assumption in the current literature on the economics of regional clusters, that is, the importance of ''knowledge externalities''. The emphasis on ''knowledge'' reflects both the declining relative importance of material inputs in many manufacturing industries (and the increasing role of service industries in the economy) and their increasingly ubiquitous nature-they are often available everywhere at nearly the same cost.
The invocation of ''external economies'' to explain observed agglomerations of economic activity parallels Alfred Marshall's classical treatment more than a century ago. Although not giving them so much emphasis as is today common, Marshall, along with economies of specialization, intermediate goods supply and labor market economies, in a much-quoted passage also discussed the influence of ''knowledge externalities '': 3 When an industry has thus chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there long; so great are the advantages which people following the skilled trade get from near neighbourhood to one another. The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air … Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and improvements in machinery, in processes and the general organization of the business have their merits promptly discussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes the source of further ideas. (Marshall, 1920: 271) In Marshall's time-on the eve of the introduction of the telephone but long before the advent of modern communication technologies-it was natural to emphasize the importance of proximity and word-of-mouth communication for the spread and exchange of new ideas. The spatially bounded nature of knowledge needed no further explanation.
Today, in a world of searchable databanks and instantaneous Internet connections, the role of geographical distance for the diffusion of knowledge is no longer so obvious. Indeed, the view has become prevalent that, as soon as knowledge becomes articulated and put into code, distance no longer matters to its diffusion. In order to explain the observed continued importance of ''localized knowledge spillovers'' (see, e.g. Jaffe et al., 1993; Antonelli, 1994; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996 ; and the survey by Feldman, 1999) , it has become customary to invoke the concept of ''tacit knowledge''. As a prominent exponent of this view puts it: … [T]he propensity for innovative activity to cluster spatially will be the greatest in industries where tacit knowledge plays an important role.… it is tacit knowledge, as opposed to information, which can only be transmitted informally, and typically demands direct and repeated contacts. (Audretsch, 1998: 23) Access to tacit knowledge is obtained through embeddedness in local networks. This notion has become so well established that, for Almeida and Kogut (1999: 907) , for example, ''[o] ne obvious reason why knowledge should be regional is that it is held tacitly by skilled engineers who remain within the region'' (italics added).
In view of the significance attached to the concept, remarkable little attention and effort have been devoted to improve our understanding of the nature of the ''tacit knowledge'' believed to be floating around in clusters. 4 If not sooner, this issue acquires certain urgency as one tries to picture a group of engineers (and other cluster members) exchanging knowledge that can neither be expressed in words nor in other, more specialized code. How do they go about it? And what sorts of economically significant skills require for their exercise the possession of tacit knowledge?
Tacit Knowledge and Local Knowledge Spillovers
The Role of Tacit Knowledge in Contemporary Theory of Clusters Not only in economic geography but also in several other strands of literature, the notion of ''tacit knowledge''-knowledge that is important but cannot be articulated-has gained widespread currency over the past decade (Cowan et al., 2000) . However, the vagueness of the concept and the readiness with which it has been accepted without a clear understanding or consensus as to its meaning have confused more than elucidated our understanding of the dynamics of knowledge processes in industrial districts (and in other settings) (Hå kanson, 2003) .
The prevailing view on the importance of ''localized knowledge'' is based on a few deceptively simple assumptions, such as the idea that knowledge comes in two varieties: codified and tacit.
5 ''Codified knowledge'' is knowledge that has been (or could be-the important distinction is rarely made) 6 rendered in writing or other code and can be transmitted by means not requiring personal contact. ''Tacit knowledge'' is usually defined simply as the negation of its ''codified'' variety, often with a standard reference to Polanyi's (1966: 4) dictum-''we can know more than we can tell ''. 7 In the present context, it attains special significance because, using Von Hippel's (1994) metaphor, it is supposed to be spatially ''sticky''.
Tacit knowledge, it is argued, is difficult both to imitate and to voluntarily replicate. The converse is true for codified knowledge, which is assumed to ''flow'' (nearly) without friction and (nearly) without cost. This facilitates its voluntary replication and technology transfer but increases the risk of involuntary imitation. Codified knowledge can therefore, it is believed, only provide momentary competitive advantage, at best (Winter, 1987) . In its crudest form, this line of reasoning suggests that knowledge can be dichotomized into ''tacit or easily imitated'' (Almeida and Kogut, 1999: 907) :
Any codification of a piece of knowledge will eventually lead to its diffusion, thereby undermining the present possessor's possibility of using it as an ingredient in sustaining competitiveness … When formerly tacit knowledge is converted into a fully codified form, a process is initiated which will sooner or later-usually sooner-turn it into a ubiquity by making it accessible on the global market. (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999b: 16) Tacit knowledge can only be acquired through the trial-and-error of personal experience, oftentimes facilitated by more or less lengthy masterapprentice types of relationships such as the ''legitimate peripheral learning'' described by Lave and Wenger (1991) . Moreover, it is generally assumed that it cannot, or cannot easily (depending on the point of view of the author) be articulated and codified. One would expect, therefore, that its short-run diffusion would take place largely through the movement of skilled personnel, and, in the somewhat longer run, through imitation of their peers by expert practitioners (Zucker et al., 1998; Almeida and Kogut, 1999) .
However, in contemporary theory it is often assumed that, ''… where firms share the same values, background and understanding of technical and commercial problems, a certain interchange of tacit knowledge does in fact take place'' (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999a: 172) . According to this line of argument, tacit knowledge can (by some unexplained magic) be ''exchanged'' provided that the partners to the exchange share commonalities of language and beliefs, both regarding the nature of the technical and commercial realities that they confront and the rules that are expected to govern their interaction. Such conditions are believed to be characteristic of local networks and clusters whose members can therefore benefit from privileged access to locally developed tacit knowledge. Since it requires a specific social context, it is difficult or impossible to transfer tacit knowledge over long distances.
8 Conversely, ''codified knowledge'' can be easily accessed by everyone, regardless of location, and, in consequence, ''one effect of ongoing globalization is that many previously localized capabilities and production factors become ubiquities'' (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999a: 172) .
The prominence that this line of reasoning has come to enjoy is curious. First, it implicitly equates ''articulation'' with ''codification''-with the articulation of knowledge follows, automatically as it were, its codification into fixed, standardized and easily replicable form. In reality, codification is a time and resource demanding activity, the potential benefits of which are often unclear. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the time between initial articulation of knowledge and its eventual codification can be quite long (Murtha et al., 2001) . Indeed, in the absence of relevant incentives, it is probable that some articulated knowledge never becomes codified.
Second, it assumes that the proprietor of codified knowledge is unable to protect its dissemination. This, in turn, assumes that potential imitators rapidly learn about the existence of the knowledge in question, are familiar with the underlying theory, have access to the requisite tools and master the code in which the knowledge is expressed. Moreover, by some legal or illegal means-precisely which are never spelled out-they can then obtain access to the knowledge and exploit it in ways that are harmful to its original owner. In reality, of course, there are many ways in which firms can successfully protect their codified knowledge, including among the obvious ones, industrial secrecy and patenting, which at least in some industries is an efficient protective mechanism. Furthermore, knowledge only becomes economically significant when it serves to inform the successful execution of a practice. Usually, performance improves with practice and experience. Having access to the same codified knowledge is sometimes-but not always-enough to permit the skilled execution of the practice that it informs (Winter and Szulanski, 2001) .
But the converse is not true either. The assumption that skills based on tacit knowledge are more or less inimitable presupposes that a potential imitator, although mastering all other aspects of the skill or activity in question, does not share, cannot draw on or create whatever tacit understanding may be involved in its execution. In reality, the employees of firms in the same industry tend to have acquired much of the tacit knowledge that their practice requires. This puts them in a position where they can often imitate one another's advances by simple trial and error, without necessarily having access to codified descriptions of these advances.
The argument is implausible not only on theoretical grounds. Although admittedly scant, the empirical evidence available does not support it. In Zander's study (Zander, 1991; Zander and Kogut, 1995) , the degree of codifiability and articulability of manufacturing technology did not significantly increase the hazard of early imitation. McEvily and Chakravarthy (2002) , on the other hand, found that ''tacitness'' increased the time to innovation for major product innovations. However, contrary to their expectation, which was that there would be no association, they found that in the case of minor technological advances, the degree of tacitness tended to significantly reduce time to imitation. In spite of their ambiguous empirical results, these studies have two important implications for the present argument.
First, (although incidental to their main objectives) both show that more innovative firms, that is, firms able to consistently introduce new products ahead of competitors are better able to sustain their competitive advantages and that ''continuous innovation widens the competence gap between a firm and its competitors' ' (McEvily and Chakravarthy, 2002: 301) . ''Tacitness'' is associated with a lack of understanding and an inability to predict how changes in design parameters and manufacturing processes affect product performance. Due to its ambiguous nature, tacit knowledge develops only slowly over time. Firms that attempt to maintain an innovative lead over competitors would therefore seem to have a strong incentive to elucidate-through articulation-the scientific and engineering principles of their technologies. If they don't, they will risk losing their lead to competitors with a better understanding of relevant causalities.
The latter observation points to the second important implication of the two studies: the competitive and other implications of both tacit and explicit knowledge crucially depend on the degree to which it is held privately or is collectively shared within the relevant epistemic community. Both through (voluntary) transfer and (involuntary) imitation, knowledge travels more easily within than between epistemic communities, the geographical distribution and organizational configurations of which are therefore crucial for the creation and diffusion of knowledge in both ''information space'' (Boisot, 1995) and its geographical counterpart.
Epistemic Communities and Cluster Dynamics
The Contextual Nature of Knowledge All knowledge is context-dependent. It requires for its meaningful interpretation and effective application mastery of the codes (language, Epistemic Communities and Cluster Dynamics 441 vocabulary, symbols, etc.) in which it is expressed, at least intuitive understanding of the theories (implicit and explicit cognitive frames, beliefs, mental maps, etc.) to which it refers, as well as familiarity in the use of the tools of the associated practice (Hå kanson, 2003) . Neither tacit nor explicit knowledge can therefore be defined without reference to the context of the social community where it resides. Such ''epistemic communities '' 9 are formed in the engagement in a common enterprise, in which groups develop and share the commonalities of language and cognitive frames necessary for articulation and knowledge creation and that enable communication and knowledge exchange.
Conversely, in the absence of such commonalities, the transfer of knowledge is often problematic:
Within communities, producing, warranting, and propagating knowledge are almost indivisible. Between communities, as these get teased apart, division becomes prominent and problematic. Hence, the knowledge produced doesn't readily turn into something with exchange value or use value elsewhere. It takes organizational work to develop local knowledge for broader use. (Brown and Duguid, 1998: 99) Epistemic communities typically extend beyond individual organizations. In many industries, perhaps especially in knowledge-based ones, ''normative isomorphism'' through selection, socialization and vocational training leads to a professional … … pool of almost interchangeable individuals who occupy similar positions across a range of organizations and possess a similarity of orientation and disposition that may override variations in tradition and control that might otherwise shape organizational behavior. (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 152) Communities that span organizational boundaries create and legitimize common codes and cognitive frames. Due to such commonalities and the development of communication technologies, knowledge sometimes travels more easily between organizations than within them (Brown and Duguid, 1998) . Electronic engineers from different countries more easily communicate about the details of their work than they do with their local company controllers.
Some epistemic communities are geographically concentrated, as in the case of the engineers developing the flat panel display industry (Murtha et al., 2001) or the communities clustering in Silicon Valley and similar industrial districts. In the past, national borders often delimited communities and their practices, but even before the advent of jet air travel and electronic communication geographical boundaries were not always important. Scientists, for example, have long formed loose but geographically extensive communities (Knorr-Cetina, 1999) . Common pursuit of a shared scientific practice allows their members to communicate and collaborate over large distances, without necessarily having close personal contact.
The fact that knowledge moves with relative ease within epistemic communities-codified knowledge through the exchange of documents and other artifacts, tacit knowledge through trial-and-error imitation-but with relative difficulty between them has fundamental implications for the ease with which knowledge (both tacit and otherwise), can be transferred to and replicated in other locations and contexts than where it was first created. This, as I shall argue below, has implications for the significance and operations of industrial clusters.
On the Definition of Clusters
''Clusters,'' Michael Porter argues, in a much-quoted article, … represent a kind of new spatial organizational form in between arm'slength markets on the one hand and hierarchies, or vertical integration, on the other. A cluster, then, is a new way of organizing the value-chain … A cluster of independent and informally linked companies and institutions represents a robust organizational form that offers advantages in efficiency, effectiveness, and flexibility. (Porter, 1998: 79) In spite of what the quotation might suggest, the emergence of clusters is not widely recognized as a Harvard Business School discovery, or as a very recent phenomenon. However, many would concur with the idea that clusters consist of and are defined by the value-adding activities in a set of linked companies and institutions. Their co-location, it is assumed, permits the exploitation of ''locational economies'', savings that arise from the agglomeration of ''related'' economic activities. ''Relatedness'', as Richardson (1972) has pointed out, refers to two distinct situations, similarity and complementarity of activities, respectively. The latter typically refer to different stages of the value chain, the former to parallel value chain activities.
While important, the focus on ''industries'' implied by the above definitions has tended to divert attention from the fact that clusters are not only comprised of firms producing similar or complementary outputs, but also of people who belong to the same professions, have similar jobs, Epistemic Communities and Cluster Dynamics 443 formal training and types of on-the-job experience. To a considerable extent, they are familiar with and use the same theories, have the same or similar views of the world, use the same language and codes to describe it and master the tools of their common trade or industry (Grabher, 1993) . In short, they belong to the same, related or complementary epistemic communities formed around the exercise of specific professional practices.
10 Such communities share both the explicit and the tacit elements of the knowledge that inform their practice.
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Proximity may facilitate the exchange of ideas and, possibly, innovatory combinations (Camagni, 1991) , but the basic elements of a practice (codes, theories and tools) are typically common to all industry practitioners, regardless of their locations. With the advent of modern communication technologies, the choice of partners for cooperative exchanges has become increasingly insensitive to geographical distances (Gertler and Levitte, 2003; Gittelman, 2003) .
However, concentrations of epistemic communities within easy commuting distance favor the entrepreneurial formation of new ventures, some of which survive. The growth of successful start-ups creates local demand for specialized skills and encourages individuals to undertake the requisite investment in education and training. It may also attract immigration of specialists from elsewhere.
Notice, however, that these and related labor market economies exist regardless of the characteristics of the knowledge (i.e. whether tacit or explicit) possessed by the workers in question (Lissoni, 2001) . Notice also that there is no a priori way of knowing whether, for the average firm, these economies are large enough to offset potential diseconomies, such as various types of congestion costs, etc. This can only be ascertained through systematic comparison of similar firms in different types of locations and cannot be inferred through case studies of apparently successful clusters. Moreover, and more fundamentally, to the extent that such economies operate, we must be careful to specify at what systemic level-that of the cluster or that of the firm, that of the existing firm or that of the potential entrepreneur-they operate. 10 In this sense, the art of a make-up artist is complementary to, but quite distinct from, that of an actress, as is the practice of patent lawyers to that of venture capitalists. In contrast, the knowledge and skills of scriptwriters for television commercials are related to, and partially overlap with, those of playwrights. These types of relationships between individual groups of professionals and the types of practice that their members pursue are unaffected by whether the corresponding activities are organized as independent firms or within larger legal entities. An implication of the argument outlined in this paper is that a better understanding of cluster dynamics requires a better microeconomic understanding of individual behavior-how do people decide where and how (as independent entrepreneurs or as employees) to exploit their skills?
Towards a Model of Cluster Dynamics
For illustrative purposes, the model that I am about to propose takes its starting point in a study undertaken more than half a century ago. In 1950, William William-Olsson made an investigation of the regional economy of that part of the Swedish province of Små land served by the regional railroad company Halmstad-Nä ssjö Jä rnvä gar. As part of this study he developed the graph, one of the first of its kind, reproduced in Figure 1 . It depicts the history of firm formations 1877-1945 in the metal, wood and leather industries through which was formed the industrial district of Anderstorp, an industrial area renowned for its economic vitality to this day.
In 1950, almost the entire population of industrial firms in Anderstorp traced their origins to one of six original companies. No less than 30 of them were the direct or indirect descendants of one firm, Metallhyttan AB (in the upper left part of the diagram), founded in 1863 by a tenant farmer, Peter Magnusson, to produce hairpins and knitting needles by means of simple self-made machines. It is interesting to note that, with few exceptions, the descendant firms were located along the same road as the initial company. When building their homes, the workers wanted to be as close to work as possible. They therefore selected housing lots along the road between the town and their places of work. When later starting their own businesses, these were located on the plot of land originally acquired for housing purposes.
The graph and the accompanying anecdotes illustrate a number of fundamental and still valid principles of cluster growth, made all the more evident by the relative simplicity of the situation of the time: by modern-day standards, the rate of technological change was modest. The railroad, built in the years 1877-1909 provided important economic stimulus by connecting the region to Sweden's main centers of population, but-again by modern-day standards-it was by and large isolated from the world market. Moreover, Små land was a famously barren part of Sweden, devoid of natural advantages, such as good transportation, farmland or valuable raw materials-except for forests, of course, but that particular advantage applies to most of the country. Its main resource, as the graph brings out, was the ingenuity and industriousness of its inhabitants.
Entrepreneurship and New Firm Formation
The structure of the following discussion is summarized in the simple model set out in Figure 2 . In this initial version, outside influences are-as in Anderstorp in the first half of the 20th century-assumed to be negligible. However, the model recognizes the exogenous determinants of (largely domestic) demand in terms of the (1) overall rate of growth in the economy, and (2) the specific impulses from the development blocks (Dahmé n, 1988) or industrie motrice (Perroux, 1988) driving the economy at any specific time. It also accepts, as exogenously given, the nature of the opportunities Epistemic Communities and Cluster Dynamics 445 Figure 1 . The growth and development of industries in Anderstorp 1877 -1945 (WilliamOlsson and Fries, 1950 available within prevailing technological trajectories (Dosi, 1988; Kenney and Von Burg, 1999; Marsili, 2002 ). In the model, entrepreneurship and new firm formation provide the decisive impulse for economic growth and innovation (Malmberg and Maskell, 2002) . This reflects both the experiences in Anderstorp in the first part of the last century, and that in other dynamic regions, such as Silicon Valley, during the last couple of decades (Schoonhoven and Eisenhardt, 1992) . The details of the cultural, economic and psychological roots that account for local variations in the propensity to set up new firms are too complex to pursue here (Garvin, 1983; Kirchhoff, 1994a; Klepper, 2001 ).
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But regardless of the exact nature of the motives that drive people at different times and in different parts of the world to set up their own Figure 2 . A model of cluster dynamics in a closed economy 12 In Anderstorp of the early 20th century, the dream of fairy-tale wealth and early retirement was probably not a major driving force. The goals of the small-scale entrepreneurs that William-Olsson interviewed were more mundane; escape from a quarrelsome boss and the desire for some independence stand out as prominent motives.
businesses, the example of successful peers is likely to be important. The more start-ups in the proximity that are, or appear to be, demonstrably successful, the easier it will be to overcome the natural hesitancy to go into business on your own (Feldman, 2000b) .
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Of course, and this should not be overlooked, entrepreneurs typically overestimate their chances of success. Most new ventures are dissolved or go bankrupt. Very few ever become profitable propositions and even fewer grow to become large undertakings. However, from the point of view of cluster dynamics, the many failed ventures do not necessarily count. The growth and dynamics of industrial districts are not, I shall argue, nearly as dependent on the success rate of new ventures as on the rate of new firm formation. Clusters prosper when existing firms grow and a sufficient number of start-ups survive. A problem with many studies of cluster dynamics is the tendency to make inferences on the basis solely of surviving enterprises, forgetting the large numbers of short-lived firms censored and unobserved because of early demise. In their study of startups in the semiconductor industry, Schoonhoven and Eisenhardt (1992) found that survival rates in Silicon Valley was no different from that of other regions-the key difference was the absolute number of new firms that were founded there. Of course, the problems created by censored data are always difficult to solve-but ignoring them in the present context clearly obscures the nature of the processes involved.
In striking contrast to some of the sweeping assumptions often made in the theoretical literature, the available empirical evidence as to the influence both of clusters and of more general economies of agglomeration on the performance prospects of established firms and the survival chances of start-ups is surprisingly meager. Table 1 is not exhaustive but includes 16 studies that I have so far been able to identify that provide empirical firm level data regarding the effect of localization and urbanization economies on performance (Mudambi and Treichel, 2003) . 14 As indicated in columns 2 and 3, the studies were undertaken in varying geographical and industrial contexts and employed a wide range of different indicators of performance. Column 4 summarizes the results, as regards the importance of localization (L) and more general urbanization (U) economies. Of the 12 studies that analyzed the performance effects of 13 A caveat to this proposition should be noted: the successful growth of existing firms may offer career opportunities that reduce the perceived relative attractiveness of risky entrepreneurial ventures. 14 Due to the scarcity of relevant research, the table includes two studies where cluster locations were included merely as control variables. Thus, the strong negative relationship between cash flow and a location in Silicon Valley or New York reported by Mudambi and Zimmerman (2003) was incidental to the main purpose of their study. The location dummies were included as controls with the expectation that they would positively impact firm performance, that is, the opposite of the result obtained. Similarly, Benito et al. (2003) used dummies for cluster location as control variables but found them to have no significant effect. (Baptista and Swann, 1998) found these to be positive and two reported mixed results (Beaudry, 2001; Beaudry et al., 2002) . The remaining nine studies found performance effects to be negative or insignificant. (Interestingly, but of less immediate concern here, the measured effects of more general urbanization economies were similarly distributed.) Conclusions as to the beneficial effects of the localization of related industries therefore seem decidedly premature (Feldman, 2000a; Malmberg and Maskell, 2002) . Overall, the relationship between location and performance appears to be weak and difficult to detect. In fact, the evidence seems to imply that firms located outside the centers of their industries are oftentimes better off than their compatriots within.
In summary, the empirical evidence suggests that the prosperity and dynamics of clusters as compared to other locations may be unrelated to the co-location of firms from specific industries there, and that individual firms in clusters need not, on average, derive any unique advantages from their locations. According to this line of reasoning, the key to cluster Hazard rate of firm mortality positively associated with number of local firms in the industry at the time of founding and at the time of termination.
L: 2 a U5effect of urbanization economies; L5effect of localization (''cluster'') economies. prosperity is a high gross rate of new firm formation, and one need not-as is typically done-assume especially favorable conditions in such locations for existing firm survival and growth. 15 Should these hypotheses be true, the presence of related and supporting industries as observed in case studies of individual clusters (Porter, 1998) appears as a natural outcome of new firm formation and only spuriously related to the competitiveness of clusters.
Today, the argument appears especially plausible in clusters dominated by industries characterized by rapid technological change and high uncertainty as regards the feasibility of new technical solutions-the very conditions, in fact, that create favorable opportunities for spin-offs. Startups are frequently vehicles for introducing innovations and each can be seen as a ''bet'' on a particular technology or product solution (Audretsch, 1995) . Regions with many start-ups will have more ''bets'' and will therefore be more resilient and flexible than those dominated by a few vertically integrated firms (Saxenian, 1994) .
The hypothesis is at odds with conventional wisdom which is based on the assumption that (1) firms make informed location decisions, where the advantages and disadvantages of alternative locations are explicitly weighed against one another, and/or (2) that competition ensures that only firms in ''optimal'' locations survive. As The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography puts it:
Since … wages and land prices are higher in these [densely concentrated] regions, for firms to be willing to locate in industry centers it must be that such locations have higher productivity for some factors or lower cost for other factors. (Hanson, 2000: 484, italics added) However, the significance attached to ''location'' in this line of argument is a bit curious; it seems to require that all the many factors influencing the fortunes of firms (technology, design, managerial talent, marketing skills, etc.) must be ''optimal'' if firms are to survive.
Nevertheless, for the individual entrepreneur, a most important benefit of being located in a cluster is the good prospects of finding alternative employment following a (highly probable) failure of her venture. This and other potential benefits-such as easy access to specialized technical and managerial expertise-derive from the fact that cluster growth is associated with the development and gradual differentiation of specific, often highly specialized epistemic communities.
Although spectacular exceptions confirm the rule, most new firms are set up by people who have gained experience by working for other firms, in the same or related industries. They therefore possess the basic knowledge and master the skills, both tacit and explicit, needed in these industries. This knowledge encompasses not only technical knowledge regarding the qualities of raw materials, the characteristics and principles of production processes, etc. It also includes an understanding of market characteristics and customer needs. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the activities of most new firms are in one way or the other related to the activities of existing ones (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002) . Indeed, the process of new firm formation can often be seen as one of gradual specialization, the rate of which is determined by the size and growth of the market, but also by perceived technological opportunities.
The ''spin-offs'' from existing firms into new ones tend to fall into one or a combination of three categories: (1) diversification (serving new customers with existing products or existing customers with new products or quality of products); (2) vertical specialization (new divisions in the primary part of the value chain); and (3) spin-offs or new establishments of firms providing various kinds of specialist support functions, such as legal services, public relations, IT services, etc. The larger and the more prosperous a cluster is, the more scope it will offer to exploit advantages of specialization.
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The result of this process is the emergence of regional production networks characterized by both vertical and horizontal disintegration. Although not necessarily benefiting individual firms, such production systems avoid the dangers of lock-in entailed by vertical integration and asset specificity, especially important in the case of rapidly changing technologies characterized by high uncertainty (Foray, 1991; Storper, 1992) .
The association between vertical disintegration and agglomeration is primarily due to the logic and dynamics of new firm formation and the subsequent inertia that ties firms to their original locations. As a rule, new firms are established where their founders have previously worked and where they and their families live, their spouses work and their children go to school (Hendry and Brown, 1998; Feldman, 2000b; Romanelli and Schoonhoven, 2001) . It is within this spatially bounded social sphere that the prospective entrepreneur has most of the contacts she draws on in assembling the physical and knowledge resources required for her venture (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Schoonhoven and Eisenhardt, 1992) . In most cases, this is also where the source of the business idea can be found; most market opportunities are discovered during previous work experience.
As a long stream of research has shown, successful product innovation requires good understanding of the needs and circumstances of prospective users. Here, proximity can be an advantage, especially for small firms where managerial attention is typically a scarce resource and minimizing cost and time of travel can be important. However, it cannot be inferred that more optimal locations would not be available elsewhere, for example, where costs for land and labor are lower. Both cognitive and psychological barriers account for the tendency of firms to stick to their original locations. It is generally difficult, often impossible, to determine very precisely the impact of location on profitability, especially in relation to all other factors, whose effects are often both more visible and easier to influence. Moreover, as long as firms enjoy some competitive advantage, profits typically allow a certain degree of slack, thereby protecting top management-who may be unwilling to relocate-from having to address the issue.
Cluster Growth and Globalization
The situation facing firms today is in many ways different from that in Anderstorp during the first half of the last century. Most obviously, the increased efficiency and reduced cost of communication and transportation, in combination with political and economic integration, have made companies dramatically more dependent on foreign influences than before (Dunning, 1993) . Foreign influence, of course, whether through trade, immigration, foreign direct investment or other means, has throughout history been important for the economies of the world. However, in the past, such influence was mostly gradual; dramatic upsets were rare and far in between.
Through ''globalization'' the interdependence between firms in different countries and regions has become increasingly continuous and immediate. It is all the more fascinating to note that many of the economic processes underlying the dynamics of industrial districts appear to have changed surprisingly little. A brief comparison of Figure 1 and Figure 3 offers an interesting illustration of this fact. The latter summarizes the genealogy of some of the most important of the so-called ''Fairchildren''-the more than 30 firms spawned by Fairchild Semiconductor in Silicon Valley. Fairchild itself had its origin in Shockley Labs, a firm set up by the co-inventor of the transistor to develop the new technology. 17 The celebrated story of how ''The Traitorous Eight'', dismayed with the erratic management style of 17 Many accounts of Silicon Valley's history start with the 1955 founding of Shockley Labs, others go back to the formation of Hewlett Packard in 1938. However, as Sturgeon (2000) has shown, the structures of industrial organization and cluster dynamics originated much earlier: ''A leading role for local venture capital; a close relationship between local industry and the major research universities of the area; a product mix with a focus on electronic components, production equipment, advanced communications, instrumentation, and military electronics; an unusually high level of interfirm cooperation; a tolerance for spinoffs … were as much in evidence from 1910 through 1940 as they have been from the 1960s onward'' (Sturgeon, 2000: 16f.) .
William Shockley, decided to set up their own company echoes the less illustrious stories retold by William-Olsson and Fries (1950) of the founding of new firms in Anderstorp.
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In the mid-1950s, the process vaguely, but commonly, referred to as ''globalization'' was still in its infancy. However, there is no evidence to suggest that it fundamentally altered the salient mechanisms of cluster growth, as summarized in Figure 2 . On the contrary, there are good reasons to believe that ''globalization'' has served to strengthen the basic processes of agglomeration in evidence long before Marshall's time (Braudel, 1985) .
Globalization can favor agglomeration and cluster dynamics in three ways (Figure 4 ): (1) by enlarging the volume of demand that can be addressed from a single location, it can dramatically increase the scope for specialization and division of labor. In some regions, globalization can also; 18 Kenney and Von Burg (1999) provide similar genealogies of firms in the disk drive and LAN industries, Dahl et al. (2003) for the wireless communications cluster in North Denmark. Hamilton and Himelstein, 1997) (2) increase the volume and importance of inward foreign direct investment; and (3) promote immigration of skilled expertise on an increasingly global scale. Of course, globalization can also pose a threat to previously prosperous regions, whose producers may confront new and potentially overwhelming international competition. How local entrepreneurs can successfully react to such threats and in what circumstances ''globalization'' favors or undermines the prosperity of existing clusters are important issues, but ones that are too complex to pursue here.
The dominating share of foreign direct investments consists of acquisitions rather than greenfield investments (UNCTAD, 2000; OECD, 2003) . Foreign acquisitions are undertaken for a range of different strategic motives: access to new markets, production capacity, technology, brand names, etc. In spite of the hype associated with certain ''high-tech'' regions, it must not be assumed that foreign direct investment is solely or even primarily motivated by the desire to gain access to the assumed benefits of the locality or the wish to ''tap into'' local scientific and technical systems. If a large proportion of an industry's firms is located in a few geographical agglomerations, these regions are likely to be the home of most acquisition targets and will therefore tend to receive a correspondingly high proportion of foreign direct investments. When clusters are said to ''attract high volumes of foreign direct investment'', the phrase carries connotations that can only sometimes-and far from always-be taken literally.
Whereas the local economic benefits of foreign acquisitions are likely to be modest, the parallel influx of foreign jobseekers and entrepreneurs is potentially much more important (Zander, 2000; Saxenian, 2001) . These not only bring partially different knowledge, experience and perspectives in complement of what is already available.
19 Ethnic and other minorities often display a high level of entrepreneurship. They thereby contribute to the main driving force of cluster dynamics.
Conclusions and Implications for Future Research
As outlined above, the outstanding features of successful industrial regions are the concentration of specialized and complementary epistemic communities, on the one hand, and a high level of innovation and entrepreneurship, on the other. The two processes are mutually interdependent in ways that are often overlooked.
Much current theorizing on the dynamics of industrial clusters is based on erroneous assumptions regarding the nature and significance of tacit knowledge. It is assumed that firms within clusters have privileged access to ''tacit knowledge'' that is unavailable-or available only at high cost-to firms located elsewhere.
Access to knowledge and specialized expertise is clearly of vital importance. But such knowledge and expertise-regardless of its degree of articulation and codification-can only be accessed and exploited by individuals who are members of relevant epistemic communities. The location of such individuals and the communities to which they belong are the primary determinants of the spatial distribution of knowledge and of the speed of diffusion of new technology.
Moreover, there is a tendency in the literature to use observed characteristics of clusters in the aggregate to make inferences regarding the behavior of its components, that is, firms, entrepreneurs and the individuals they employ. 20 For individual firms, locating in a cluster brings both advantages and disadvantages. Whether-or, rather, under what circumstances-the benefits outweigh the corresponding costs is an empirical issue that cannot be resolved by reference to aggregate cluster development. Clusters can grow and prosper simply because of a high rate of firm formation and a correspondingly high number of successful new firms. Differences in the rates by which new firms are founded appear to be generally more important than variations in survival rates or the degree to which a cluster location influences subsequent performance. The fundamental advantage of clusters is the simple fact that individual jobseekers and entrepreneurs there can access interesting opportunities without having to incur the costs (in both time and money) of long distance travel or changing their homes and uprooting their families.
As has increasingly been pointed out, much of the available empirical literature suffers from a number of methodological shortcomings (Staber, 1996; Malmberg and Maskell, 2002; Martin and Sunley, 2003) . These are related to many of the prevailing theoretical assumptions regarding the nature and dynamics of clusters that I have tried to question in this paper. As a basis for the formulation and testing of theoretical propositions, the bulk of the many interesting empirical observations available in ethnographic studies of clusters and their dynamics is limited in two related respects.
Although many provide rich and valuable historical background, most are based on cross-sectional data and do not capture the failure and exit of cluster firms. The problem of censoring is, of course, generic too much economic research and notoriously difficult to effectively deal with. However, in view of the importance of new firm formation (and death) for cluster dynamics, it cannot safely be ignored if we are to arrive at (and test) realistic models of the growth and differentiation of industrial districts.
A second, related problem is that, with important exceptions, most analyses of the operations and activities of firms located in clusters are based on observations sampled on the dependent variable, that is, cluster membership. Based on the observed behavior of cluster firms, many studies emphasize, to take just one example, the vital importance of close and trustful supplier-buyer relationships, which build on long-standing personal acquaintance (Lissoni, 2001) . Apart from the problem of causality-(does successful cooperation emerge out of trustful relations or is it the other way around?)-the proposition that trustful relationships are distinguishing features of firms co-located in specific regions should not be accepted before it has been shown that firms located elsewhere do not maintain similar cooperative arrangements. The same caveat applies to almost all advantages commonly ascribed to cluster membership.
The only empirical strategy that may help us get a better understanding of the processes through which industrial agglomerations emerge and grow is by way of longitudinal studies of cohorts of firms, professionals and entrepreneurs, keeping in mind that the influences that affect the decisions and behaviors of individuals are different from those affecting the fortunes of firms, and that neither can be deduced from observations at the aggregated level of clusters.
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